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ECONOMICS OF LAW
AS CHOICE OF LAW
RALF MICHAELS*
If it is true that the more developed state of economics, as compared to the other
social sciences, has been due to the happy chance (for economics) that the important
factors determining economic behaviour can be measured in money, it suggests that
the problems faced by practitioners in these other fields are not likely to be dissipated
simply by an infusion of economists, since in moving into these fields, they will
commonly have to leave their strength behind them. The analysis developed in
economics is not likely to be successfully applied in other subjects without major
modifications.
R.H. Coase

1

I
INTRODUCTION: ECONOMICS DISCOVERS CHOICE OF LAW
Economics is about choice.2 It is about private choice and public choice, and
it is about choice made by individuals and choice made by the state. This means
economics of law should be about choice of law. It should be about choice of
the applicable private and public law, and it should be about private and public
choice of law—choice of law by individuals or by the state.
In a broad sense, this is the case. Normative law and economics tells us what
kinds of legal regimes to choose from the various models we can think of:
negligence or strict liability for tort law, specific performance or damages for
contract law, restrictions of market entry or monopoly positions as triggers of
antitrust law, and so forth. Normative law and economics also tells us whether
the relevant choices should be made by individuals—especially through
contract—or whether the respective rules should be provided by the state.
Choice of law as a field is also about choices like the one between
negligence and strict liability. But this choice is not made in general: it is made
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1. R.H. Coase, Economics and Contiguous Disciplines, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 201, 209 (1978).
2. See, e.g., the title of one widely used textbook, JAMES D. GWARTNEY ET AL., ECONOMICS:
PRIVATE & PUBLIC CHOICE 3 (11th ed. 2005) (“Economics is about how people choose.”); RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (7th ed. 2007) (“Economics, the science of human
choice”).
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in a specific constellation, for example between the negligence regime
governing in the state where a defective machine was sold and the strict-liability
regime governing in the state where that machine was produced. Choice of law
is about private and public choice of law, the tension between objective
determination of the applicable law and party autonomy. But the law thus
chosen is always, at least so far, the law of a state.3
In view of this similarity in sensitivities between choice of law and law and
economics, it may seem surprising that economists all but ignored choice of law
for many years. Although conflict of laws had been the first field that legal
realism attacked and although it remains the field in which realist and postrealist conceptions have had the most impact,4 law and economics, as a
(sometime) self-declared heir of realism, has stayed away from the field for a
long time. This is no longer so. Things have changed, and economics of choice
of law has become prominent. The economics of choice of law is the theme of
two books5 and one lecture at the Hague Academy of International Law,6 and it
boasts contributions to two encyclopedias7 and by now a considerable number
of law-review articles,8 many of which have recently been compiled in a two3. Ralf Michaels, The Re-State-ment of Non-State Law. The State, Choice of Law, and the
Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1209 (2005).
4. For the best analysis of the role of legal realism in this oft-told history, see Annelise Riles, A
New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 973 (2005).
5. The first is MICHAEL J. WHINCOP & MARY KEYES, POLICY AND PRAGMATISM IN THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (2001). For reviews, see Richard Garnett, 26 MELB. U. L. REV. 236 (2002); Peter
Mankowski, 69 RABELSZ 175 (2005); Megan Richardson, Policy Versus Pragmatism? Some Economics
of Conflict of Laws, 31 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 189 (2002); Michael J. Solimine, The Law and
Economics of Conflict of Law, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 208 (2002); Roberta Wertman, 35 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 1160 (2003). A second book is JÜRGEN BASEDOW & TOSHIYUKI KONO, AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006). For a review, see Paul Lagarde, 103
REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 665 (2007). Giesela Rühl (Hamburg Max Planck
Institute for Comparative and International Private Law and European University Institute, Florence)
is working on a comprehensive monograph on the topic.
6. Horatia Muir Watt, Aspects Economiques du Droit International Privé, in ACADEMIE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAYE, 307 RECUEIL DES COURS 25 (2004).
7. Erin A. O’Hara & Francesco Parisi, Conflict of Laws, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 387 (Peter Newman ed., vol. 1, 1998); Erin O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein,
Conflict of Laws and Choice of Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 631–60 (Bouckaert
& De Geest eds., vol. 5, 2000), available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/ 9600book.pdf; Francesco Parisi
& Larry E. Ribstein, Choice of Law, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE
LAW 236 (Peter Newman ed., vol. 1, 1998). See also the brief survey in Alan O. Sykes, International
Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 757, 816–18 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell
eds., 2007).
8. More recent foundational articles in the United States include the following: LEA BRILMAYER,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 169–218 (2d ed. 1995); Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90
GEO. L. J. 883 (2002); Larry D. Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1990);
Erin O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
1151 (2000); Giesela Rühl, Methods and Approaches in Choice of Law: An Economic Perspective, 24
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 801 (2006); Michael J. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice
of Law, 24 GA. L. REV. 49 (1989); Joel P. Trachtman, Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation
of Government Responsibility, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 975 (1994); Joel P. Trachtman, Economic
Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2001), adapted as chapter 2 in JOEL P.
TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 26–71 (forthcoming 2008). Two
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volume issue.9 Almost all of these studies are normative10 and oriented toward
either efficiency or maximization of welfare: they set out to yield criteria for
better, more efficient, conflict-of-laws norms. The powerful arguments, almost
thirty years old, why efficiency and welfare are both problematic criteria to
determine better rules11 are largely ignored, as they are in other areas of the law.
This interest of economists in conflict of laws holds promises for economists
and lawyers alike. The benefits to economists are not the topic of this article
(though they exist without doubt).12 The law can certainly benefit from
interdisciplinary analysis. Famously and repeatedly referred to as a “dismal
swamp,”13 choice of law as a discipline indeed yearns for intellectual nurture.
The clean laboratories of economic modeling promise to provide answers to the
perpetual problems that choice of law faces as a discipline. Where choice of law
is viewed as too conceptual and abstract,14 economics promises much-needed
pragmatism.15 Where choice-of-law doctrine is chided for its oblivion to the
practical impact of its rules,16 law and economics promises to provide empirical
foundations.17 Where choice of law is viewed as devoid of theory,18 economics

general articles on the economic analysis from a non-U.S. perspective are Kurt Siehr, Ökonomische
Analyse des Internationalen Privatrechts, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KARL FIRSCHING ZUM GEBURTSTAG
269 (Dieter Henrich & Bernd von Hoffmann eds., 1985); Horatia Muir Watt, Law and Economics:
Quel apport pour le droit international privé?, in LE CONTRAT AU DEBUT DU XXIEME SIECLE—
ETUDES OFFERTES A JACQUES GHESTIN 685 (Gilles Goubeaux et al. eds., 2001).
9. THE ECONOMICS OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (Erin O’Hara ed., 2007).
10. For a positive analysis, see Solimine, supra note 8.
11. E.g., Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980); Duncan Kennedy,
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981); Mario Rizzo,
The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641 (1980). On the ineffectiveness of this critique, see
Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to Law and Economics?, 64 MD. L. REV. 101, 109–12 (2005). For
criticism of efficiency as a criterion for optimal choice-of-law rules (and a promising alternative
approach), see Christian Kirchner, An Economic Analysis of Choice-of-Law and Choice-of-Forum
Clauses, in BASEDOW & KONO, supra note 5, at 34.
12. See, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles of CrossBorder Legal Frameworks in a Globalized World Balancing Rights With Responsibilities, 23 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 451 (2008).
13. The quote was first introduced by torts scholar William L. Prosser in Interstate Publication, 51
MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953).
14. For a particularly stark recent statement, see Earl M. Maltz, Do Modern Theories of Conflict of
Laws Work? The New Jersey Experience, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 527, 547–48 (2005).
15. WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 6–7.
16. Hillel Y. Levin, What Do We Really Know About the American Choice-of-Law Revolution?, 60
STAN. L. REV. 247, 249, 256–60 (2007).
17. See generally Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357 (1992); Solimine, supra note 8; Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of
Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 949 (1994). See also Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic
Courts and Global Governance (Aug.11, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=923907.
18. Riles, supra note 4, at 974.
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promises to be that theory.19 Where choice of law is viewed as hopelessly
complex,20 economics promises to provide clear guidelines.21
This article does not aim at evaluating the contribution of law and
economics at large. Instead, the interest lies in a very particular question,
namely, how far economic models can function as doctrine. This may look like a
deliberate misreading of their purpose. If one views law and economics as
antidoctrinal and antiformalist, it seems inappropriate to read it as doctrine. Yet
most doctrine today is, or claims to be, antiformalist. And most economic
models make very concrete proposals as to how choice-of-law rules should be
shaped. In this sense, economic analysis is like any other analysis of law.22 And
to the extent it aims to inform the resolution of cases, it can, and should, be
measured against the same standards.
This article makes it clear that economics does not and probably cannot
fulfil this function. However, this failure makes a very important contribution to
choice of law. It is the heroic failure of economic analysis, not its claimed
success, that presents a real, and immensely valuable, contribution. Economic
models achieve clarity, but the unrealistic abstractions necessary to achieve it
only highlight the inescapable messiness of the problems with choice of law.
The isolation of certain values in the economic analysis, especially those of
private and public ordering, respectively, shows that it is the combination of,
and the conflict between, these values that defines the field. The failure of
attempts to develop new solutions on the basis of abstract economic reasoning,
regardless of existing doctrine, makes us see clearly the high degree of
disciplinary knowledge that is present, though often unacknowledged, within
our doctrinal concepts and rules, imperfect as they are.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Part II compares
existing doctrine and economic models on a macro level. This comparison
shows greater proximity than is usually acknowledged. The economic models
are largely based on existing doctrinal models, while those models in turn can
be read as resting on certain economic ideas. The part focuses especially on
three types of models—a private law model, an international law model, and a
combined model—and addresses the role of the best law in each of these
models. Part III moves to a micro-comparison and analyzes how the different
economic models fare in responding to existing problems in choice of law. It
uses three different questions as example. One question concerns the rules for a
specific problem, the law applicable to transboundary torts. The second
question concerns a traditional, general problem of choice of law, namely the
19. Michael J. Whincop & Mary Keyes, Towards an Economic Theory of Private International
Law, 25 AUSTRALASIAN J. LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 1 (2000).
20. This criticism is shared (or adopted) by economists. See RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 430 (1990).
21. WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 7; but see Trachtman, Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at
10–11.
22. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 4 (2004).
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issue of characterization. The third question is one of design of rules, namely
that of whether rules or standards are preferable. In all three questions, it turns
out that economic models replicate both the responses given to doctrinal
questions and the disputes over these results existing in doctrine. In this sense,
instead of resolving these disputes, existing economic models reinforce the
impression that these disputes are not resoluble. Part IV finally goes to the core
of the three models by analyzing an issue central to all of them: the relation
between party autonomy and binding state law. This analysis reveals that two of
the economic models ultimately collapse into substantive-law models (of private
law and of international law respectively), whereas the third one, the combined
model, makes a meaningful and potentially renewing contribution to the field of
choice of law. The conclusion assesses the contribution made by economics to
choice of law and notes that this contribution is very important, though not in
the anticipated way.
II
ECONOMIC MODELS AS DOCTRINAL MODELS
Economists have claimed that “[t]he theories [of choice of law] that have so
far held centre stage owe virtually nothing to economic theory.”23 Consequently,
most economic analyses start out by dismissing existing doctrines of choice of
law24 before presenting their own economic model as something entirely new.
But the hope to resolve, once and for all, existing questions, seems improbable
in view of the “foregone conclusion,” expressed in this very journal forty-five
years ago, “that everything worthy of trying has been tried before, under the
same or other labels.”25 And, alas, the claim that an economic approach brings
something entirely new turns out to be exaggerated too.
On the one hand, doctrine never developed oblivious to economics and
economic theory. As early as the 1890s, German choice-of-law scholar Ludwig
von Bar, in a presentation for economists, based choice of law on two simple
economic arguments: a reciprocity argument (each country is better off if it
treats foreigners equally to citizens) and a rough market-related argument
(trade will prosper more if foreigners can take some rules of their own legal

23. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1152; cf. Guzman, supra note 8, at 885–86 (“[E]fficiency
analysis in general, and law and economics in particular, has, to date, had only a minor impact on
choice of law.”).
24. Guzman, supra note 8, at 890–94; O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1165–84; WHINCOP &
KEYES, supra note 5, at 8–26. For a more benevolent analysis, see Trachtman, Conflict of Laws, supra
note 8, at 998–1022. See also Kazuaki Kagami, The Systematic Choice of Legal Rules for Private
International Law: An Economic Approach, in BASEDOW & KONO, supra note 5, at 15, 24–28.
25. Kurt H. Nadelmann, Marginal Remarks on the New Trends in American Conflicts Law, 28 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 860, 860 (Autumn 1963), cited in FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND
MULTISTATE JUSTICE 6 (1993).
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systems with them).26 One of the “new foundations” formulated by Andrew
Guzman more than 110 years later reformulates this finding quite exactly.27 This
part will show how some doctrinal arguments can be read as economics (albeit
unformalized and often crude)—typically, the economics of the time. Even the
most formalistic doctrines can be shown to rest on economic ideas.
On the other hand, most economic models owe more than they admit to
traditional models in choice of law. In choice-of-law doctrine, no agreement
exists on what questions should be asked. Is choice of law about conflicts
between states and their desires to regulate (as the governmental-interest
analysis dictates it)? Or is it about conflicts between private rights acquired in
one state and public regulation in another (as in a vested-rights theory)? Or is it
not about conflicts at all, but merely about the technical designation of the
applicable law? Economic models would be extremely helpful if they could
point us to the right question, but few of them try to do so. Instead, most of
them choose one of these questions as the relevant one without spending much
time justifying this choice, and then give economically substantiated answers to
their chosen question.
With some generalization, it is possible to distinguish three economic
models: a private-law model, an international-law model, and a combined
model. If this article assigns the work of individual scholars to one of these
models, this is done neither to claim they fit fully in one of the categories, nor to
claim that all they contribute is the establishment of these models. However, the
fact that they pose different questions makes it possible to group them and
discuss the ensuing groups instead of the individual models. The first two of
these models share close affinity with two doctrinal models: the vested-rights
theory (in its old version and in its new version as country-of-origin principle)
and governmental-interest analysis. The third model, in turn, has spurred new
approaches to choice of law as a regulatory instrument.
A. Private-Law Models
A first economic approach, represented in particular by Whincop and
Keyes, and to some extent by O’Hara and Ribstein, can be called a “private-law
model.” An economic private-law model will apply considerations from the
economics of private law to the design of private-international-law rules;28 it

26. LUDWIG VON BAR, DAS FREMDENRECHT UND SEINE VOLKSWIRTSCHAFTLICHE
BEDEUTUNG 26 (1893). Von Bar was the author of several books on conflict of laws, two of which have
been translated into English. The reciprocity argument, though usually phrased in less economic terms,
is even older. See the references in JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 35,
45–46 (3d ed. 1846).
27. Guzman, supra note 8, at 927–30.
28. WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 3 (“[T]he policies that underlie what we think of as
‘substantive’ private law areas should, where suitable, inform the private international law rules that
apply in these areas.”).
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focuses on individuals and individual interest.29 The goal is either efficiency or
the maximization of global social welfare, understood as the sum of the utilities
of all individuals worldwide.30 The main way to achieve these goals is private,
contractual choice of law.31 When parties choose the applicable law, this choice
should usually be enforced. When private choice is either impossible or not
executed, the contracts paradigm does not cease to govern: choice-of-law rules
should enable the law applied to fit as smoothly into a contractual scheme as
possible. Substantively, choice-of-law rules should mimic the result of a
hypothetical choice-of-law agreement between the parties.32 Formally, they
should provide clear and predictable rules enabling the parties to contract, or
settle, against a firm baseline.33 One solution that some authors accept, if
somewhat reluctantly, is to resort to the subsidiary use of an approach of
“regulatory advantage.”34 According to this approach, developed by Judge
Posner, courts should determine the applicable law by reference to the
government that has the greatest ability to regulate the relevant conduct, which
usually coincides with territoriality.35 For torts outside market relations, this is
usually lex loci delicti.36 This should ensure, ideally, that parties will be governed
by the best (and thus the most efficient) substantive law.
When all focus is on the interests of individuals, other policy
considerations— especially those promulgated by states as mandatory laws—
are suspect. Once the necessity of mandatory rules has been defined away
(because private transactions are presumed efficient), such laws are opposed
because they are unlikely to represent the interests of all individuals
represented37 and are (therefore) often inefficient.38 Invocations of sovereignty

29. Id. at 34; O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1152–53, 1185.
30. Guzman, supra note 8, at 898; Siehr, supra note 8, at 274.
31. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1186–87; Rühl, supra note 8, at 802; WHINCOP & KEYES,
supra note 5, at 29.
32. Michael Whincop & Mary Keyes, Putting the ‘Private’ Back into Private International Law:
Default Rules and the Proper Law of the Contract, 21 MELB. U. L. REV. 515, 536 (1997); but cf.
WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 22. See also Hans-Bernd Schäfer & Katrin Lantermann, Choice of
Law in Economic Perspective, in AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 5, at 87, 97–98. For discussion, see Jürgen Basedow, Lex Mercatoria and the Private International
Law of Contracts in Economic Perspective, in AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 5, at 57, 69–71.
33. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1188–92; WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 44–45 (for
contracts).
34. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1190–92.
35. The concept is developed by RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 602–03
(2003). For examples of the concept’s application, see Kaczmarek v. Allied Chem. Corp., 836 F.2d 1055,
1058 (7th Cir. 1987), and Spinozzi v. Itt Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1999). For critical
discussion, see Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, Lex Loci Delictus and Global Economic Welfare:
Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 120 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1139–43 (2007); O’Hara & Ribstein, supra
note 8, at 1179–80; Solimine, supra note 8, at 59–68; Trachtman, Choice of Law, supra note 8, at 1022–
26; WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 20.
36. Spinozzi, 174 F.3d at 844–45; WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 97–104; O’Hara & Ribstein,
supra note 8, at 1216–18.
37. Paul A. Stephan, The Political Economy of Choice of Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 957, 958–59 (2002).
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to justify their application are denounced as communitarian39 and as
smokescreens for what are really political tastes.40 Policies and justice are
dismissed because they display no pragmatic values.41 Consequently, the desire
of parties to avoid such inefficient rules is to be encouraged and supported.
This, in fact, is one main purpose of party autonomy. By and large, the only
policies worth pursuing in private international law are those of private law,42
and that means, apparently, the protection of private-property rights and
transactions. The tendency expressed in the title of one leading article—“from
politics to efficiency”43—suggests how politics is viewed as standing in contrast
to desirable efficiency.44
Distrust in politics and a focus on the interests of individuals over those of
governments are not, of course, inventions of the private-law model. Such
considerations underlie an old doctrinal approach to choice of law: the theory of
vested rights, under which courts are bound to enforce rights vested under a
foreign law typically determined by some territorial connection.45 That approach
is now universally condemned, and economists within the private-law model
largely chime in on the condemnation,46 even though they share many of the
convictions underlying the vested-rights theory47—the focus on individual
interests and on territoriality, a disdain for public policy, mandatory substantive
laws and governmental interests, and an emphasis on formal interests like
predictability over substantive considerations of policy.
Closer scrutiny suggests grounds for the affinity. The vested-rights theory is
not grounded merely in formalism or metaphysics, as is regularly suggested. Its
main propagator, Joseph Beale, used instrumental and even purely economic
justifications for applying a single pertinent law to activity: “society requires the
final distribution of all costs, including those of accidents, so that they will come
into the cost of production or of use and be shared among the ultimate

38. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1156–60.
39. Stephan, supra note 37, at 957–58.
40. Id. at 958.
41. For the strongest statement in this regard, see WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 32–34.
42. WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 3.
43. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8; see also Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in
Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA. L. REV. 363 (2003) (criticizing such a development toward politics).
44. But see, for clarification of this point, Erin O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, Rules and Institutions
in Developing a Law Market: Views from the US and Europe, TUL. L. REV. Part I.D.4 (forthcoming
2008) (“[T]he relevant choice is not between efficiency and other values, but between political and
contractual mechanisms for achieving efficiency.”).
45. For overview, see Ralf Michaels, EU Law as Choice of Law? Reconceptualising the Country-ofOrigin Principle as Vested-Rights Theory, 2 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 195 (2006).
46. See Guzman, supra note 8, at 891; O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, 1166–68. But see id. at 1165
(“[F]or all its arbitrariness, the vested rights theory comes closer to satisfying an efficiency criterion . . .
.”). See also WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 14–15. But see Stephan, supra note 37, at 957 n.2.
47. See, for example, Judge Posner’s reasoning in Kaczmarek v. Allied Chem. Corp., 836 F.2d at
1057, and WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 17–19.
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consumers,”48 which requires “keeping the expense of new social protection at
its lowest point consistent with efficiency.”49
The underlying idea that insurance costs must be internalized as costs of
production and as such must be held low underlies Pigovian economics (which
were popular in Beale’s time), as well as current economic thought. If Pigou is
now nonetheless widely rejected,50 it is so not because of the idea of
internalization. Rather, today’s economists usually follow Coase’s finding
contrary to Pigou that, as long as rights are clearly defined and transaction costs
are sufficiently low, the market will be better than the state at optimally
allocating rights. In choice of law, the parallel is to let parties themselves
determine the applicable law. Consequently, what economists mainly criticize is
that the vested-rights theory allows no space for party determination of the
applicable law. But this is not an intrinsically necessary element of a theory
focused on vested rights. This shortcoming has been remedied by the
renaissance of the vested-rights theory as a country-of-origin approach,51
whereby the law applicable to a product or a company is determined by its
origin, and that origin can be selected more or less freely. That idea, as a choiceof-law principle, rests on explicitly economic considerations not dissimilar to
those for the vested-rights theory, especially the desire to lower costs arising
from having to deal with multiple legal systems.52
In view of this close proximity, it is not surprising how many of the
proposals made from the private-law model repeat solutions of the First
Restatement:53 predictable rules,54 application of lex loci for tort liability without

48. Joseph Beale, Social Justice and Business Costs, 49 HARV. L. REV. 593, 608 (1936). For
discussion, see id. at 604–08.
49. Id. at 609. Beale’s affinity to economics and social thought is occasionally recognized. For
conflict of laws, see Riles, supra note 4, at 977–82. More generally, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The
Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379, 401 (citing to the request for
courts to use more economics, in J. BEALE & B. WYMAN, THE LAW OF RAILROAD RATE
REGULATION 24–40 (1906)). This early book makes it unlikely that Beale endorsed economic
considerations only after publication of the Restatement, as suggested by Ibrahim J. Wani, Borrowing
Statutes, Statutes of Limitation and Modern Law, 57 UMKC L. REV. 681, 696 n.84 (1989).
50. For a defense of Pigou by a legal historian, see Brian A.W. Simpson, Coase v. Pigou
Reexamined, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (1996). Coase’s harsh response is preceded by a quote from Stigler:
“it takes an economist to read an economist.” R.H. Coase, Law and Economics and A.W. Brian
Simpson, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 103 (1996).
51. For similarities, see Michaels, supra note 45.
52. See, e.g., COPENHAGEN ECONOMICS, THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF THE COUNTRY OF
ORIGIN PRINCIPLE IN THE PROPOSED SERVICES DIRECTIVE—FINAL REPORT 10 (2005),
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file22901.pdf. An additional justification—impact on regulatory
competition—belongs to the combination model and will be discussed infra II.C.
53. See generally William M. Richman, The First Restatement of Conflict of Laws on the TwentyFifth Anniversary of its Successor: Contemporary Practice in Traditional Courts, 56 MD. L. REV. 1196,
1197–1200 (1997).
54. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1188; Rühl, supra note 8, at 840; Schäfer & Lantermann,
supra note 32, at 90–92; WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 44.
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distinction between loss-allocation and conduct-regulation,55 opposition to
general questions like characterization,56 renvoi,57 and a public-policy
exception.58 Indeed, sometimes the First Restatement itself is proposed as an
economically superior solution to choice-of-law problems.59 And this proposal is
quite implausible. Whatever the advantages of the First Restatement may be in
the abstract, it did not stand the test of time. Yet, although economics prides
itself as an empirical science, the private-law model has not developed a
response to the factual failure of the First Restatement.
B. International-Law Models
Almost diametrically opposed to this private-law model is a second model.
Supported in particular by Joel Trachtman, it can be called an “internationallaw model” because it extends the economics of international law into choice of
law. Methodologically, this model is in many ways similar to the private-law
model. Like the private-law model, the international-law model assumes that
actors are rational in the sense that they maximize their own utilities; its
normative goal is efficiency; and the instrument to achieve efficiency consists in
rules that set optimal incentives for the actors or that mimic contractual
agreements between them, ensuring that they engage in efficient (and refrain
from inefficient) conduct. The decisive difference between this model and that
of private law is that the actors in question are not individuals; they are states.60
In this model, choice-of-law rules must be shaped so as to enable states, not
individuals, to maximize the sum of their interests. States maximize the
effectiveness of their own policies as embodied, especially, in their legislation.61
Analogizing jurisdiction to property, Trachtman asks us to allocate prescriptive
jurisdiction with the state that cares most about a particular problem. The
consequence of such an allocation is that the role of party autonomy is very
limited.
Unlike the private-law model, the international-law model draws more
explicitly on a doctrinal model: governmental-interest analysis, as established by
55. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1217; WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 96–97 (without
discussion).
56. Infra III.B.
57. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1197.
58. Id. at 1194–95.
59. Erin O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, Interest Groups, Contracts and Interest Analysis, 48 MERCER
L. REV. 765, 768–69 (1997); William H. Allen & Erin A. O’Hara, Second Generation Law and
Economics of Conflict of Laws: Baxter’s Comparative Impairment and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1011,
1043–47 (1999).
60. BRILMAYER, supra note 8, at 7; Sykes, supra note 7, at 762; Joel P. Trachtman, The
Methodology of Law and Economics in International Law, 6 INTERNATIONAL LAW FORUM DU DROIT
INT’L 67 (2004). For discussion of whether this is compatible with methodological individualism, see
Ralf Michaels, Two Economists Three Opinions? Economic Models for Private International Law–
Cross-Border Torts as Example, in BASEDOW & KONO, supra note 5, 143, at 163–65; Trachtman,
Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 21–23.
61. See Trachtman, Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 15–23.

MICHAELS__BOOK PROOF_FINAL.DOC

Summer 2008]

ECONOMICS OF LAW AS CHOICE OF LAW

10/27/2008 7:54:45 AM

83

Brainerd Currie.62 Governmental-interest analysis assumes that conflicts of law
are conflicts among sovereigns over which of them gets to regulate a specific
conduct. Although interest analysis has been influential, Currie’s own position
that forum law should usually be applied63 has not found many followers. Most
courts and scholars suggest some degree of balancing between laws, at least
when they are in true conflict.
This debate is not usually presented as an economic one, but it easily can be.
Translated, Currie’s much-maligned preference for application of forum law
becomes an application of Pareto efficiency. If, as is the case for Currie, the
application of forum law provides the initial assignment of jurisdiction,64 then
the move to another state of affairs—application of foreign law—is justified,
according to the Pareto definition of efficiency, only under two conditions:
First, the move makes no state worse off, and, second, the move makes at least
one state better off. The first condition excludes the move in all cases in which
the forum has an interest in the application of its law. It follows that forum law
applies in false conflicts when only the forum is interested and in true conflicts
when both states are interested. The second condition excludes the application
of foreign law in “unprovided-for” cases—cases in which neither the forum nor
the other state is interested in their laws’ being applied. In such a case,
application of the foreign law would make no state worse off, but it would also
make no state better off. Foreign law applies only in false conflicts when the
forum is disinterested and the other state is interested, the only case in which
the move to foreign law is Pareto efficient. This is Currie’s result, too.
Such (simple) economic reasoning underlies not only Currie’s variant of
interest analysis. The resistance to Currie’s preference for applying forum law
can be translated as resistance to Pareto efficiency, in accordance with
dissatisfaction among many law-and-economic scholars with this criterion.
Globally, Currie’s forum preference leads to the mutually suboptimal result that
most states usually apply their own law, a situation that can be (and often is)
presented as a prisoners’ dilemma.65 Among the many proposals to overcome
this dilemma, one has a decidedly economic flair: Baxter’s comparativeimpairment theory.66 Baxter proposed to resolve true conflicts not by simple

62. Trachtman, Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 16.
63. For the clearest exposition of this theory, see Brainerd Currie, Notes in Methods and Objectives
in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, reprinted in BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 177–87 (1963).
64. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 64, at 46–48, 183.
65. BRILMAYER, supra note 8, at 181; William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43
HARV. INT’L L. J. 161, 219–26 (2001); Kramer, supra note 8, at 280; O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at
1182; Joel P. Trachtman, Externalities and Extraterritoriality: The Law and Economics of Prescriptive
Jurisdiction, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: COMPARATIVE AND EMPIRICAL
PERSPECTIVES 642, 662–63 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Alan O. Sykes, eds. 1997).
66. William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963). For
economic reformulation (and critique), see Allen & O’Hara, supra note 59; Trachtman, Conflict of
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preference of the forum law (as Currie had suggested), but rather with a view
toward which state’s policy would be more seriously impaired if it were not
enforced. To reach this result, he effectively used three common economic
instruments that show his differences from Currie. Baxter’s first economic
instrument was the hypothetical Coasean bargain:67 if the states could negotiate
over who gets to regulate, jurisdiction would always end up in the state with the
greater interest. In the presence of high transaction costs, however, such
transactions do not take place, so we must give jurisdiction to that state from
the start. One justification for the preference of one state’s interests over those
of another is found in Baxter’s second move, which was, effectively, to replace
Currie’s focus on Pareto efficiency with Kaldor–Hicks efficiency. In
comparative impairment, one state can be made worse off (through
nonapplication of its laws) if the loss to that state is more than outweighed by
the gain to another state by enforcement of that latter state’s laws.68 Another
justification lies in Baxter’s third move, which was to slightly change the
conditions of Currie’s game-theoretical model. Currie had focused essentially
on a one-shot game, in which it is rational for each state not to cooperate.
However, in repeat games a certain degree of cooperation is mutually
beneficial.69 Applied to choice of law, this suggests that if each state is willing to
give up jurisdiction to other states, in the long run all states will profit.70
The point here is not that traditional doctrine actually qualifies as
sophisticated economic analysis. The traditional doctrine does not go much
beyond this in terms of economics and resolves specific conflicts with casespecific doctrine. The economic model, by contrast, expands greatly on the
doctrine and introduces additional economic ideas in order to better understand
the bargaining process: information asymmetries (where one party has
information that the other lacks), the theory of muddy entitlements (according
to which property rights are not fully defined ex ante), and the theory of the
Laws, supra note 8, at 1017–22. Antoine Pillet had developed a similar idea in France forty years
earlier. See ANTOINE PILLET, TRAITÉ PRATIQUE DE DROIT INT’L PRIVÉ 106 (1923):
The way to resolve conflicts is to give preference to the law of the state which has the greatest
interest that the goal pursued by the law in question be attained . . . , that its law regulate the
litigation. If a sacrifice must be made, it should be as small as possible (translation by author).
The similarity between Pillet and Baxter is occasionally recognized in North America. See, e.g.,
FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 141 (special ed. 2005); William
Tetley, A Canadian Looks at American Conflict of Law Theory and Practice, Especially in the Light of
the American Legal and Social Systems, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 299, 314 n.47 (2000); Trachtman,
Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 26 n.91.
67. Baxter, supra note 66, at 7–11; cf. Allen & O’Hara, supra note 59, at 1021.
68. Cf. Baxter, supra note 66, at 17–18 (“The principle is to subordinate, in the particular case, the
external objective of the state whose internal objective will be least impaired in general scope and
impact by subordination in cases like the one at hand.”).
69. The most famous formulation of this insight can be found in ROBERT AXELROD, THE
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). For an earlier formulation, see MICHAEL TAYLOR, ANARCHY
AND COOPERATION (1976).
70. Baxter, supra note 66, at 10–11. For doubts as to the workability of this approach, see
BRILMAYER, supra note 8, at 193–96; Kramer, supra note 8, at 299–300.
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nature of the firm. The point is that, despite its greater economic sophistication,
the economic model is largely an extension of the doctrine, not an independent
analysis. For this reason, the economic model shares the weaknesses of the
doctrinal model, in particular the most urgent problem with governmentalinterest analysis: the difficulty of determining what actually constitutes
governmental interests, and the manipulability of the concept. This problem has
plagued scholars of governmental interests since the theory’s inception; it
provides perhaps the strongest point of criticism in the doctrine. Yet the
problem is ignored, or assumed away, in economic models.
C. Combined Models
A third set of economic models can be called “combined models” because
they combine the private- and the international-law models. For combined
models, suggested most explicitly by Andrew Guzman, the interests to be
maximized are those of individuals: choice of law should maximize global
welfare as calculated between individuals. However, the focus on the incentives
of choice-of-law rules is not only on individuals, but also on states as creators of
substantive laws. Rational states are assumed to care, in their lawmaking, only
for the effects these laws have on their own citizens; effects on other states’
citizens are externalities. This means that states will allow globally inefficient
transactions if they are locally beneficial, and they will prohibit transactions that
would be globally efficient if they would be locally detrimental.71 Strict
extraterritoriality is inefficient because it enables states to externalize costs
from their laws; strict territoriality is inefficient because it prevents states from
regulating conduct taking place outside their borders even if that conduct harms
them.
A combination of private and international aspects is of course common in
choice-of-law doctrine. Most choice-of-law methods are not purely private or
public; they combine public and private considerations and differ in the weight
they give to each of these. The Second Restatement72 is a prime example of a
mixed approach. Its central provision, Section 6, combines public-law-model
factors73 and private-law-model factors74 with factors arising from the specific
cross-border situations.75 The European choice-of-law regulations provide
comparable combinations: most of their rules are based on a private-law model,
but they contain exceptions, in accordance with governmental-interest

71. Guzman, supra note 8, at 899–900.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1969).
73. These factors are (a) the needs of the interstate and international system, (b) the relevant
policies of the forum, and (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue.
74. These factors are (d) the protection of justified expectations and (f) certainty, predictability,
and uniformity of result.
75. These factors are (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law and (g) ease in
determination and application of the law to be applied.
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analysis.76 In this sense, nearly all existing doctrines would fall under the
combined model. However, their translation into economics would present
problems precisely because they are so mixed and eclectic.77 Because the
relationship between the underlying policies is unclear, so are its economics.
This may explain why economic analyses have all but ignored the Second
Restatement,78 although it represents the most widely used approach to choice
of law in the United States. (By contrast, Savignyan choice-of-law ideas, central
to continental European thinking, are being translated into an economic model
by Giesela Rühl, who emphasizes deliberate neutrality toward the substance of
potentially applicable law.79)
Recently, however, writings on choice of law have gone beyond presenting a
mishmash or eclectic mix and have explicitly addressed this clash of public and
private policies in a more systematic manner. Robert Wai has presented a
subtle interpretation of choice of law as an instrument that simultaneously
enables and enhances private freedom and the effectuation of state policies and
that creates both a private sphere outside of states and a “touchdown”
relationship with states.80 For him, “the function of transnational private law is
not simply facilitation of transactions, but also compensation for harms and
social regulation of transnational conduct.”81 The private law in private
international law is not only about contracts, but also about compensation and
interests of third parties; when private parties do not bring about the right
degree of compensation, the state must intervene.82 Although not based in
economics (nor disinterested in the political relevance of the subject), Wai’s

76. See Erik Jayme, The American Conflicts Revolution and its Impact on European Private
International Law, in FORTY YEARS ON: THE EVOLUTION OF POSTWAR PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN EUROPE 15 (1990); Frank Vischer, New Tendencies in European Conflict of Laws and the
Influence of the U.S. Doctrine – A Short Survey, in LAW AND JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN 459 (James A. Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides
eds., 2002). For a more general discussion, see Ralf Michaels, The European Conflict of Laws
Revolution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1607 (forthcoming 2008).
77. William A. Reppy, Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mishmash?, 34 MERCER L.
REV. 645 (1983).
78. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1183–84 (claiming the Restatement “ends up sanctioning
whatever the courts want to do”); Trachtman, Choice of Law, supra note 8, at 1012, 1016 (mentioning
the Restatement as a balancing test).
79. Rühl, supra note 8; see also Giesela Rühl, Die Kosten der Rechtswahlfreiheit: Zur Anwendung
ausländischen Rechts durch deutsche Gerichte, 71 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND
INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 559 (2007); Giesela Rühl, Party Autonomy in the Private
International Law of Contracts: Transatlantic Convergence and Economic Efficiency, in Conflict of
Laws in a Globalized World, in ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN 153 (Gottschalk et
al. eds., 2007).
80. Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of
Private International Law in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 223 (2002); Robert
Wai, Transnational Private Law and Private Ordering in a Contested Global Society, 46 HARV. INT’L L.
J. 471 (2005); Robert Wai, The Interlegality of Private International Law, 71 LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS.
105 (Summer 2008).
81. Wai, Transnational Private Law, supra note 80, at 471.
82. Id. at 474–75.
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approach rests on certain economic considerations not dissimilar to those
suggested by Guzman. Like Guzman, Wai considers the competitive superiority
of local over global regulatory institutions,83 the need of law to address
externalities,84 and especially the function of private international law to
coordinate various regulations in order to avoid both over- and
underregulation,85 as well as regulatory competition that would enable
opportunistic behavior by private actors.86 These ideas are present as economic
considerations in the recent work by Muir Watt, who endorses many of Wai’s
points and enriches them with inspirations from the economic literature.87
What distinguishes proponents of combined models, in economics and in
doctrine alike, is their respective views on the desirability of regulatory
competition and party autonomy. For Guzman, choice-of-law rules should
guarantee that the applicable law is the law of a state that is least likely to
externalize the costs of its legislation, for that law is likely to be closest to a
globally optimal law. This makes it necessary to determine the applicable law
objectively on the basis of effects; domicile plays only a limited role, and the
place of conduct plays no role at all. Party autonomy is desirable only when
transaction costs have no third-party effects.88 By contrast, proponents of
regulatory competition find an argument for party autonomy even when thirdparty externalities may exist. Party autonomy is advocated as an instrument to
force states to abolish inefficient laws. The idea, in a nutshell, is that states will
compete in a market for laws for parties to choose their laws.89 In order to
prevail in this market, the theory goes, states must provide efficient laws—laws
that benefit greatly and cost little. Analysts of jurisdictional or regulatory
competition have long all but ignored choice-of-law rules; lately, regulatory
competition has been used more explicitly as a principle for choice-of-law
rules.90
D. The Best Law
All three models face the question presented at the outset: What is special
about choice of law as opposed to regular economic analysis? Why is the result
of a choice-of-law question not simply the choice of the more efficient law, as
83. Wai, Transnational Liftoff, supra note 80, at 239, 243–44.
84. Id. at 251.
85. Id. at 253–54 (“The basic role of private international law in addressing transnational
regulatory gaps is to coordinate the process of regulation by national authorities and national laws.”).
86. Id. at 254–55.
87. Muir Watt, supra note 6.
88. Guzman, supra note 8, at 913–14.
89. Larry E. Ribstein & Erin O’Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
661 (2008).
90. E.g., Horatia Muir Watt, Concurrence d’ordres juridiques et conflits de lois de droit privé, in LE
DROIT INT’L PRIVE: ESPRIT ET METHODES: MELANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE PAUL LAGARDE 615,
625–33 (2005); Francisco J. Garcimartín Alférez, Regulatory Competition: A Private International Law
Approach, 8 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 251 (1999).
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economic analysis of domestic law would suggest? Such an approach is indeed
known in choice-of-law doctrine as “better law theory”—the idea that the judge
should apply the better of the two laws. “Better” is defined at least in part in
economic terms, as “superiority of one rule of law over another in terms of
socio-economic jurisprudential standards.”91 In other words, the judges should
apply the law that is the best from an economic perspective—if efficiency is the
criterion, then they should choose the most efficient law. Under this approach,
economic analysis of substantive law would immediately offer itself as a choiceof-law doctrine.
The better-law approach is the direct translation of normative economics
into choice of law. Courts have occasionally used it as such, and have based the
preference of one state’s rules on comparative negligence over the other state’s
rules on contributory negligence explicitly on the (alleged) economic
superiority of a comparative-negligence regime.92 So it is not surprising that
nearly all economic analyses address the theory. What is surprising, at first, is
that proponents of all three models reject the approach. Indeed, this is so
although every one of these models has a very specific idea of the role of the
“best law” in choice of law. Simply substituting determination of the best law
for the choice-of-law analysis would mean that choice of law would be no
different from substantive law. At the same time, the goal of efficiency or
welfare maximization makes it necessary to formulate the best law as the goal
of the analysis. The struggle from choice-of-law doctrine between substantive
justice and conflicts justice is not resolved; it is merely transposed into a
struggle between substantive efficiency and conflicts efficiency.
Why “better law” is not a solution for the international-law model is
obvious: if law is the effectuation of government policies, then this
determination cannot be undermined by invocation of some otherwisedetermined best law.93 The best law must be determined by the (democratically
legitimated) legislator, not by the judge or the economist (or by private parties).
Respect for autonomy of states (which would translate within doctrine into
respect for sovereignty) makes judgments about the best substantive laws

91. Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267,
296 (1966). See also Heath v. Zellmer, 151 N.W.2d 664, 673–76 (Wis. 1967); Diesel Service Co. v.
AMBAC Intern. Corp., 961 F.2d 635, 643 (7th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by Generac Corp.
v. Caterpillar Inc., 172 F.3d 971 (7th Cir. 1999).
92. See McDaniel v. Ritter, 556 S.2d 303, 316–17 (Miss. 1989) (applying Tennessee rule of
comparative negligence over the common-law rule of contributory negligence of another state with the
most significant relationship, because the Tennessee rule is “demonstrably superior . . . [b]oth from the
point of view of civil justice and economic efficiency . . . .”); Threlkeld v. Worsham, 30 Ark. App. 251,
255–56 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990) (applying the same reasoning as the Court in McDaniel). Ironically, the
main proponent of the better-law approach himself had some sympathy for contributory over
comparative negligence. See Robert A. Leflar, Comments on Maki v. Frelk—Comparative v.
Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REV. 918 (1968). The
economic debate is less clear than the decisions suggest. For a recent perspective, see Oren Bar-Gill &
Omri Ben-Shahar, The Uneasy Case for Comparative Negligence, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 439 (2003).
93. Trachtman, Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 42.
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undesirable. Trachtman invokes Kegel’s preference of “conflicts justice over
substantive justice”94 and thus assumes (though without real argument) one
position within the hotly fought doctrinal debate between conflicts justice and
substantive justice.
By contrast, rejection from the private-law model is prima facie surprising.95
When such rejection is not due to a misunderstanding of the better-law theory
as focusing on justice instead of efficiency,96 the main arguments against a
better-law approach are that judges would not be up to the task of assessing
efficiency97 or that “[r]esolving a choice of law problem by applying the efficient
law will only have the desired effects on accident precaution if parties expect
the law to apply.”98 These arguments prove more than they want to. If judges
cannot assess efficiency, and if parties cannot expect an efficiency standard to
apply, then judges should not engage in efficiency analysis within substantive
law either—for example by applying the Learned Hand formula to determine
negligence. And, of course, they should not use efficiency as a criterion to
develop choice-of-law rules either. Moreover, if judges are unable to assess the
best law, it is not clear why either the parties themselves or the maker of choiceof-law rules should be better equipped. Ultimately, rejection of the better-law
approach is based more on a question-begging definition of the problem than
on fully fledged efficiency analysis: “the situation we are studying is not the
formulation of tort rules, but the selection between them in order to resolve a
conflict of laws.”99
The most interesting rejection is that made by the combined model.
Guzman rejects the better-law approach with a combination of the arguments
brought forward under the other two models: judges are ill-equipped to
determine the better law (a private-law-model argument), and the competing
policies so determined may be incommensurable (an international-law
argument).100 But then it turns out that his rejection is based on a
misunderstanding of the better-law theory as either focusing on justice and
reasonability101 or as necessarily leading to a forum bias.102 And Guzman himself

94. Id. at 42 n.110; cf. Trachtman, Conflict of Laws, supra note 8, at 889 n. 45, 995–96.
95. See, e.g., Peter Mankowski, Europäisches Internationales Privat- und Prozessrecht im Lichte der
ökonomischen Analyse, in VEREINHEITLICHUNG UND DIVERSITÄT DES ZIVILRECHTS IN
TRANSNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRÄUMEN 118, 127 (Ott & Schäfer eds., 2002); O’Hara & Ribstein,
supra note 8, at 1178–80; WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 25; WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at
21–22 (generally), 90 (with regard to tort law). But see Kramer, supra note 8, at 339; Solimine, supra
note 5, at 215 (arguing that the emphasis on efficiency in economic analyses of choice of law suggests a
better law approach).
96. WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 21; Guzman, supra note 8, at 893.
97. Allen & O’Hara, supra note 59, at 1030–31; Guzman, supra note 8, at 893; O’Hara & Ribstein,
supra note 8, at 1178–80.
98. WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 90.
99. Id.
100. Guzman, supra note 8, at 893–94, 896.
101. Id. at 893. For a similar misunderstanding, see WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 21.
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requires an idea of the better law when he establishes “the globally efficient
substantive law” as the goal.103 Judges are unable to find it, but economic
analysis outside the courtroom can nonetheless set it as an ideal.
III
ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS AS DOCTRINAL SOLUTIONS
The economic models are more similar to existing doctrine than is usually
admitted. If this is so, it must be possible to evaluate the answers they give to
specific doctrinal problems. Most doctrines can be translated into economic
models but become quite unconvincing as economics. Translated into
economics, stripped of all its peculiarities, doctrine turns into very bland,
straightforward, and unsatisfactory models. The economic models are
undoubtedly superior in their economics, but does this mean they can also claim
to give more sophisticated answers to traditional problems of choice of law?
Some such claims are somewhat implausible, for example, the idea that a return
to the First Restatement and its rules would create an advantage.104 Others are
less novel than their proponents present them, for example, the insight that
Hartford Fire involved an actual conflict.105 But the models do provide responses
to specific questions, and this is where they should be tested. As the analysis
shows, the results are of limited use for doctrine. Specific subject matters prove
to be too complex for meaningful economic guidance. General problems like
characterization do not become dispensable. Debates on the optimal design of
choice-of-law rules replicate similar debates in doctrine. Translated into
doctrine, the economic analysis looks very bland.
A. Specific Subject Matters: Transboundary Tort Liability
One good example of a specific subject matter is the problem of
transboundary torts.106 The main problem here is whether the law of the place of
conduct or the law of the place of injury should govern. Some economists in a

102. Id. at 896–97. Although the relation to forum bias is an empirical reality, it is not a necessary
element of the theory.
103. Id. at 898.
104. See references supra note 59.
105. Guzman, supra note 8, at 886, 918–19, referring to Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S.
764, 797–99 (1993). The criterion for “true conflicts” used by the Supreme Court in Hartford Fire was
inconsistent with interest analysis, which has long admitted that, contrary to what the Supreme Court
assumed, states may also have an interest in permitting certain conduct. The decision in Hartford Fire
rested on a misunderstanding of the Restatement for International Law. See Andreas Lowenfeld,
Conflict, Balance of Interests, and the Exercise of Jurisdiction to Prescribe: Reflections on the Insurance
Antitrust Case, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 42, 50 (1995). See also Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction,
27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1003, 1059–60 (2006).
106. See more extensively, Michaels, supra note 60 (with further references); Antonio Nicita &
Matteo M. Winkler, The Cost of Transnational Accidents: Evolving Rules on Torts (2007), available at
http://www.cbs.dk/content/download/67236/929984/file/The%20cost%20of%20transnational%20accide
nts%20(Nicita-Winkler%202007).pdf.
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private-law model prefer, at least prima facie, the place of conduct because it is
thought to have a regulatory advantage.107 The country-of-origin principle
likewise favors the place of conduct because this enables defendants to rely on
just one law. Economists from an international-law model, by contrast, focus on
the place of injury that feels the effects of the conduct. Among proponents of
the combined model, finally, views are mixed: Guzman strongly disfavors
relying on the law of the place of conduct because doing so would encourage
externalization.108 Others provide a more complex analysis: If defendants must
comply with the strict rules of their home states, they may face a competitive
disadvantage in foreign markets; this consideration could favor preference for a
place-of-injury rule.109 However, if defendants must comply with the strict rules
of the place of injury, they may be unable to compete in that market because
they face a disadvantage vis-à-vis local companies that are better equipped to
deal with the local law. Closer analysis shows that even this discrepancy in views
presents too simple a picture because the focus is only on the tortfeasor and his
conduct, not on that of the victim. Taking Coase seriously requires focusing on
both tortfeasor and victim and their respective conduct, or on place of conduct
and place of injury and their respective laws and policies.110
All of this makes the design of optimal choice-of-law rules such a complex
and fact-specific analysis that workable rules are unachievable through a
rigorous economic analysis. At some point, each analysis strikes a decision on
the basis of intuition. The general choice of the law of either the place of
conduct or the place of injury is made on the basis of the need for simplicity
rather than that of economic efficiency. This brings clarity, but this clarity
comes for the sake of grossly simplifying the cases to be solved; once specifics
are included, their solutions are indistinguishable from those of traditional
doctrine.
B. General Devices: Characterization
If economic models cannot resolve difficult specific problems, can they help
dispense with general institutions that the doctrine still carries with it? One
example is characterization. Traditional methods rely strongly on
characterization—whether an issue belongs to the law of contract or tort, or
whether it is substantive or procedural, is a relevant question to determine the
adequate choice-of-law rule. More modern approaches have tried to reduce or
eliminate the need to characterize, but although the methods and concepts have

107. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1217 (but ultimately preferring place of injury in order to
minimize characterization issues). It is not obvious why, as regards choice of law (versus enforcement),
the place of conduct should have a regulatory advantage over the place of injury.
108. Guzman, supra note 8, at 921–24; Schäfer & Lantermann, supra note 32, at 117–18.
109. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 35, at 1144–46.
110. See Michaels, supra note 60, at 158–60, 175–76.

MICHAELS__BOOK PROOF_FINAL.DOC

92

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

10/27/2008 7:54:45 AM

[Vol. 71:73

changed, the need to characterize has remained: loss-allocating rules must be
distinguished from conduct-regulating ones.
Economists readily adopt the frequent critique of characterization and ask
that economic analysis should dispel the need to characterize, for it increases
uncertainty (and thus transaction costs).111 However, instead of avoiding
characterization, economic models replicate it. Some writers merely avoid the
problem, as did the First Restatement. O’Hara and Ribstein largely put
characterization in the background and develop rules for contracts,
corporations, and marriage, without worrying much about explaining how to
distinguish these concepts.112 Whincop and Keyes deal with characterization on
the level of definition.113 A similar solution is to argue at such a high level of
abstraction that application on the ground becomes detached—when the
distinction is between transactions with third-party externalities and
transactions without such externalities,114 or when the focus is entirely on private
law and we are asked to believe the claim that “most private law situations have
few third party effects.”115
If characterization is not assumed away, attempts are made at its
simplification, but such attempts face the same problems as similar suggestions
in doctrine. Some writers shift the boundaries between concepts—by rejecting
the distinction between loss-allocating and conduct-regulating rules,116 or by
treating “market torts” like contracts.117 This move does not abolish the need to
distinguish categories; it merely changes the categories: now market torts must
be distinguished from nonmarket torts. One may of course deny that this kind
of distinction between market and nonmarket torts is a matter of
characterization: “courts should focus on whether the parties have bargained
with each other instead of asking whether a case involves a ‘contract’ or a
‘tort.’”118 But not only is this still characterization, as is admitted elsewhere;119 it
also leaves unaddressed the prior question, central to traditional doctrine, of
why we should view market torts like contracts rather than like torts.
Indeed, not only the need for characterization remains; we can even
recognize traditional modes of characterization replicated as economic
approaches. The old debate whether the objects of characterization are facts or
rules of law, now usually considered moot, is revived when O’Hara and
Ribstein argue that “to maximize ex ante predictability, characterization should

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 6–7; O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1168, 1189–90.
O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1197–1221.
WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 89.
Guzman, supra note 8, at 894.
WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 4.
O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1179–80.
Id. at 1211; WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 107–23.
O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1190.
Id. at 1221.
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be based on facts rather than legal theory.”120 The same is true for the question
of how to characterize. If Guzman assumes that the existence vel non of thirdparty externalities can be determined objectively,121 this is equivalent to
autonomous characterization according to objective criteria. If, for Trachtman,
“the mandatory nature of a law is an indicator, and is perhaps the best evidence,
that the law addressed externalities in the private sector,”122 this is in essence a
characterization lege causae—the applicable law determines its own
categorization.123
Economists can, for some time at least, avoid the difficulty and messiness of
characterization because of their affinity for models: something can be assumed
to be a contract, a relationship with third-party effects, et cetera. But the clarity
is a mirage. Once these models are applied to the real world, they provide no
more guidance than do the doctrinal approaches they aim at replacing. As
models, the proposals are pure and attractive; as doctrine they are no better,
often strikingly similar, but far less differentiated than existing doctrinal
approaches. Doctrine is replicated as economics, but its problems are not
resolved by the translation.
C. Design: Rules or Standards?
A third question to ask is whether choice-of-law solutions should be
formulated as specific, predictable rules (as in the First Restatement), or as
open-ended standards or approaches (as in the Second Restatement). Since the
general economic literature has not (yet) found common ground,124 it is not
surprising to find discrepancies among different analyses of choice of law. What
is surprising is that these different positions on the rules-versus-standards
question largely align with different models, although the arguments for or
against rules or standards should normally apply similarly to transactions
between individuals and transactions between states. Proponents of the privatelaw model by and large favor clear and rigid rules as a baseline for negotiations
and as a means to decrease uncertainty as to litigation outcomes.125 By contrast,
Trachtman, as a proponent of the international-law model, points out the

120. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1221; see also id. at 1190 (“[T]he applicable choice-of-law
rule should turn on facts, which are harder for courts to manipulate than legal categories.”).
121. See Guzman, supra note 8, at 894–95.
122. Trachtman, Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 6.
123. For critical analysis, see Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Qualification, Classification, or
Characterization Problem in the Conflict of Laws, 50 YALE L.J. 743 (1941).
124. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE. L.J. 557 (1992).
But see Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256
(1995). For an overview, see Louis Kaplow, General Standard of Rules, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS 631–60 (Bouckaert & De Geest eds., vol. 5, 2000), available at
http://encyclo.findlaw.com/9000book.pdf.
125. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1199, 1201 (contracts), 1217 (nonmarket torts), 1220–21;
Schäfer & Lantermann, supra note 32, at 90–92; WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 25, 36–37
(contracts). For extensive debate, see Rühl, supra note 8, at 831–40.
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advantages of “muddy entitlements,”126 that allow ad hoc adaptation in the
individual case and may provide incentives to states to bargain more effectively
over the exact allocation of jurisdiction.
This alignment is in accordance with traditional doctrine, in which privatelaw models like the First Restatement emphasize the need for predictable rules,
whereas governmental-interest analyses prefer open standards. Unfortunately,
the economic models make little use of experience with these approaches. The
First Restatement was unsuccessful in large part because its rules turned out to
be far less predictable than intended and because the costs from inflexibility
turned out to be too great. Furthermore, if both models view the First
Restatement as the only possible example for rules, they ignore both the far
more-favorable experience with rules in Europe and the U.S. experience with,
and proposals for, new, but better, rules.127 In contrast, experience with
governmental-interest analysis suggests issues that should be relevant for
economic analysis, too: high transaction costs for negotiations among states
leave muddy entitlements intact, which in turn lead to frequent forum
preference and thus globally suboptimal outcomes. In short, existing economic
analyses replicate the doctrinal debate, but with not much attention spent on
experiences from that debate.128
IV
PRIVATE ORDERING AND PUBLIC LAW
This analysis so far has revealed that economic models, viewed as doctrine,
lose much of their novel character. Furthermore, as doctrine, the economic
models propose solutions that often appear strangely to disregard the
complexities of the problems they set out to answer. However, one thing the
economic analyses do make clear is that the choice of one or the other model
has implications for results—not only in doctrine, but also in economic
reasoning. Since the central difference between a private-law model and an
international-law model is the role of private-versus-public determination of the
applicable law, it seems worthwhile to focus on this in detail.
A. Private Choice and Mandatory Rules
Emphasis on party autonomy is sometimes promoted as a decisive
contribution from economic analysis. This is a little exaggerated: party

126. Trachtman, Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 45–46.
127. SYMEON SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT
AND FUTURE 425–37 (2006); William M. Richman, Review Essay: A New Breed of Smart EmpiricallyDerived Conflicts Rules: Better Law Than “Better Law” in the Post-Tort-Reform Era, 82 TUL. L. REV.
2181 (forthcoming 2008).
128. An exception is Rühl, supra note 8.
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autonomy has long been accepted as a basis for choice of law in contracts.129 One
eminent conflicts scholar has voiced her surprise as to why law and economics
even bothers to prove the efficiency of party autonomy.130 And, indeed, the two
limits to party autonomy that economists name—negative third-party
externalities and information asymmetries—are mirrored in the traditional
constraints to party autonomy regarding so-called internationally mandatory
rules131 and regarding specific kinds of contracts with structurally weaker parties:
consumer contracts, employment contracts, and insurance contracts.132
Differences are only those between rule and exception. For the private-law
model, party determination of the applicable law should be a cornerstone of
choice of law;133 where neither third-party externalities nor information
asymmetries exist between the parties, the parties should be permitted to
choose the law that governs their relationship.134 For the international-law
model, objective determination of the applicable law is the rule, but “[i]f the
governmental interest is reduced substantially enough, then a rule of party
autonomy may be followed.”135
Whether party autonomy should be the rule or the exception is not entirely
unimportant. For example, the private-law model successfully suggests that we
should enforce contractual choice more often. It does so by shifting our
attention to the relatively unproblematic, bilateral relationship between two

129. See REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON THE LAW
APPLICABLE
TO
CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATIONS
(Rome
I)
art.
3,
available
at
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st03/st03691.en07.pdf;
UCC
§
1-105
(2001);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAW § 187 (1971); PETER NYGH, AUTONOMY IN
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 8–14 (1999); Mathias Reimann, Savigny’s Triumph, 39 VA. J. INT’L L.
571 (1999); Rühl, Party Autonomy, supra note 79, at 155–58. For party autonomy in other areas of the
law than contract, see Dorothee Einsele, Rechtswahlfreiheit im Internationalen Privatrecht, 60
RABELSZ 417 (1996); Jan von Hein, Rechtswahlfreiheit im Internationalen Deliktsrecht, 64 RABELSZ
595, 603–06 (2000); see also Peter Nygh, The Reasonable Expectations of the Parties as a Guide to the
Choice of Law in Contract and in Tort, 251 RECUEIL DES COURS 269 (1995).
130. Muir Watt, supra note 8, at 688.
131. REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON THE LAW
APPLICABLE
TO
CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATIONS
(Rome
I)
art.
9,
available
at
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st03/st03691.en07.pdf. The term “mandatory rules” is
unfamiliar in U.S. law, but the reasoning is essentially the same. Patrick J. Borchers, Categorical
Exceptions to Party Autonomy in Private International Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
132. Borchers, supra note 131.
133. WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 5–6 and passim; O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1185.
See also Kirchner, supra note 11; Schäfer & Lantermann, supra note 32, at 92. For a positive analysis of
the rise of party autonomy, see Ribstein, supra note 43.
134. Erin A. O’Hara, Economics, Public Choice, and the Perennial Conflict of Laws, 90 GEO. L.J.
941, 943 (2002).
135. Trachtman, Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 64; see id. at 20 (“Given this focus on
governmental preferences, where such preferences are not implicated substantially, either as evidenced
by the fact that the law at issue is merely facultative, or because the international setting so attenuates
the governmental preferences, . . . it would seem appropriate to allow private parties to determine the
governing law.”).
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rational actors,136 and away from the messy problems of what is euphemistically
called “third-party externalities,” and which comprises everything that is
problematic for choice of law for contracts. The international-law model in
contrast, by focusing on policy conflicts between states, suggests that third-party
externalities are usually implicated, so party autonomy retains a relatively small
space.
However, these are not substantive differences. Such substantive differences
emerge once more controversial issues are addressed. The challenging question
is not whether parties can choose the applicable law in general, but whether
they can, by so doing, avoid application of rules that would normally be
mandatory. Traditional doctrine has developed relatively subtle (and somewhat
unpredictable) criteria to distinguish norms that are internally mandatory (and
that can be evaded through choice of another law) from norms that are
internationally mandatory (and that apply even if the parties choose another
law). Economists have fewer scruples about suggesting broad solutions. Here,
the models differ significantly.
Proponents of a private-law model propose that such choice should be
widely possible, except where a legislature explicitly provides for an
internationally mandatory character.137 Sometimes this is explained as a direct
consequence of viewing party autonomy as a mere extension of freedom of
contract.138 Yet this would not explain why party autonomy, as a mere extension
of freedom of contract, should supervene such rules that could not be avoided
through mere freedom of contract.139 The stronger argument is that such
mandatory laws are to be avoided precisely because they are binding
domestically: “If tort rules are mandatory on a domestic basis, choices of
foreign law are the only way to contract on other, preferred terms.”140 From this
perspective, there is no reason to confine party autonomy to contract law.
Indeed, it has been proposed for other areas of private law like tort law,

136. For the complexity of even this relationship, see Fleur Johns, Performing Party Autonomy, 71
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243 (Summer 2008).
137. For this exception, see O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1184, 1199–1200; WHINCOP &
KEYES, supra note 5, at 61.
138. E.g., Richard A. Posner, Foreword, in WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at xiv, xv:
[T]he choice of law to be applied to contract disputes should be regarded a s simply an
extension of the parties’ decision regarding what terms to include in their contract. Choice of
law is just another term. If they specify a choice of law, it should be honored even if . . . the
choice is to circumvent the mandatory rule of a jurisdiction the law of which would otherwise
apply.
This is an extension of contract law only if contract law is about freedom of contract, not about its
limits.
139. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 8, at 329 (“[P]roposing that parties should always be free to
choose the law that governs their contract . . . would be tantamount to repealing the law of contract by
enabling parties to opt out of any limitation not imposed by every state or nation in the world.”).
140. WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 78. Cf. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1152, 1154–55.
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regulatory law like securities law141 or antitrust law,142 and even noneconomic law
like marriage, including same-sex marriage.143 More importantly, perhaps, the
argument is not necessarily confined to international transactions. The
traditional distinction between different types of mandatory rules applies only
to international cases; in purely domestic contracts, application of domestic law
has nothing arbitrary, and consequently party autonomy is excluded.144 But if,
indeed, mandatory rules are presumably inefficient and party autonomy leads
to efficient contracts and efficient laws, then there is no reason to reserve it to
transnational actors. Individuals may suffer from inefficient laws in purely local
transactions, too. This suggests that the freedom to choose the applicable law
over mandatory domestic norms should be granted even in purely domestic
contracts.145 At this point, there is no difference between choice of law and
general freedom of contract. What starts as choice of law ends up as a radical
transformation and privatization of domestic law.
In contrast, proponents of an international model are quite opposed to
parties’ freedom to evade any mandatory rules through private choice of law. In
such models, party autonomy is usually not even considered. Insofar as private
international law is conceived of only as conflicts between states over the right
to regulate a certain conduct, parties do not even enter the picture as relevant
actors. (This matches the opposition to party autonomy in governmental
analysis.)146 In Joel Trachtman’s words, “[T]he mandatory nature of a law is an
indicator, and is perhaps the best evidence, that the law addressed externalities
in the private sector.”147 As a consequence, domestically mandatory rules should
be treated, prima facie, as internationally mandatory rules: “In fact, in
circumstances of mandatory law, where we assume externalities domestically, it
is appropriate to assume the existence of interstate externalities.” Here, the
141. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Recognition: Rethinking the International
Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998); Roberta Romano, Empowering
Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998); Roberta Romano,
The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 387
(2001). For criticism, see Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice
Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999); Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a
Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom?, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498 (1998); Merrit B. Fox, The
Issuer Choice Debate, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 563 (2001); Horatia Muir Watt, Choice of
Law in Integrated and Interconnected Markets: A Matter of Political Economy, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 383
(2003).
142. Choi & Guzman, supra note 141; Guzman, supra note 8.
143. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1209 (with an exception for noncontractual aspects like
marriage subsidies and parenting rights, borrowed from F.H. Buckley & Larry Ribstein, Calling a Truce
in the Marriage Wars, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 561, 598–99 (2001)).
144. REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL ON THE LAW
APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 15 (Dec. 15, 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAW § 187 cmt. d (1971); Rühl, Party Autonomy, supra note 79, at 159–60.
145. Gerhard Wagner, The Virtues of Diversity in European Private Law, in THE NEED FOR A
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 3, 14–15 (Jan Smits ed., 2005); Rühl, Party Autonomy, supra note 79, at
179.
146. See CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 63, at 732–33.
147. Trachtman, Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 6.

MICHAELS__BOOK PROOF_FINAL.DOC

98

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

10/27/2008 7:54:45 AM

[Vol. 71:73

opposite happens from what occurred in the private-law model: wherever
domestically mandatory rules are in play, party autonomy no longer has a role.
Party autonomy does not go beyond ordinary contractual freedom.
B. The Collapse Into Domestic Law
There is an extreme difference between giving the parties the ability to
avoid all mandatory rules of domestic law and letting mandatory rules always
trump. Given the importance of these strong normative claims, we should
expect proponents of one or the other model to give considerable attention to
the question of which model to choose. Yet what we find are largely ad hoc
appeals to common sense.
Whincop and Keyes, for example, argue that “as befits a theory of private
international law, we emphasise parties and party interests.”148 But why would
private international law not equally suggest an international-law model? And
what model would befit a discipline called conflict of laws? More importantly,
why would private law be only about individual interests?149 Why would its main
function not be the restriction of private autonomy?
Joel Trachtman offers the opposite argument for the international-law
model simply by using a different definition of private law. For him, “if choice
of law and prescriptive jurisdiction is not about governmental preferences, then
it is not about law, as law is the expression of governmental preferences.”150
Although, for the private-law model, all good law is private, for the
international-law model, all law is public. The distinction between private law
and public law is moot151 and “must be replaced by a more subtle metric,”152
which turns out to be between the state and the market; and because law is
provided by the state as a public good,153 all law is public law.154 But even if all
law is public law, why must it necessarily trump individual autonomy, especially
in international transactions?
Not only are these questions unanswered; the exchange suggests that what
lies at the heart of the differences between these models is nothing less than a
debate about the role of law. That debate, important as it is, has little to do with
private international law; it is a debate about substantive law. The tension
between mandatory state norms and private ordering, well known as a central
theme from private law, usually takes on a decisively different character once it
is addressed as a problem of choice of law, as the difficult distinction between
148. WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 4 (emphasis in original).
149. For different uses of private law, see Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the
State? Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 843, 846–53 (2006). For the
idea that private law is about private interests, see id. at 847–48.
150. Trachtman, Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 21, 77.
151. Trachtman, Conflict of Laws, supra note 8, at 1035.
152. Trachtman, Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 5.
153. Trachtman, Conflict of Laws, supra note 8, at 1045.
154. Trachtman, Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 21.

MICHAELS__BOOK PROOF_FINAL.DOC

Summer 2008]

ECONOMICS OF LAW AS CHOICE OF LAW

10/27/2008 7:54:45 AM

99

different kinds of mandatory rules shows. For most economic models, such
difficult distinctions hardly exist. Instead, each of these two models simply
extrapolates one side of the tension—the private side or the state side—and
builds its entire choice-of-law approach on that side. For proponents of the
private-law model, mandatory rules are generally bad: “The primary
justification for mandatory rules may come from interest group effects or
violations of standard economic assumptions.”155 The international-law model,
in sharp contrast, simply assumes, “heroically,” that mandatory rules represent
common interests.156 Public-choice problems with the creation of substantive law
either are ignored (because it would be “immodest for prescriptive jurisdiction
and choice of law rules to take this concern into account”157) or cannot be
helped by choice of law.158
These assessments are, remarkably, as general as they are radical. The
differentiated (if ultimately unsatisfactory) way in which the doctrine of choice
of law distinguishes rules that are mandatory in the international sense from
those that are mandatory in a purely domestic sense is lost. Even more
amazingly, these assessments on the quality of mandatory rules are based
almost entirely on assumptions.
These assumptions are crucial elements for each model. If a state legislator
makes a norm mandatory, it may do so for various reasons. The legislator may
consider the norm necessary to prevent third-party externalities it may consider
the norm efficient between the parties, or it may aim at goals other than
efficiency—paternalism, for example. If states are the players, as they are in the
international-law model, then this determination is by definition rational. By
contrast, if individuals are the players, as is the case in the private-law model,
such norms are presumably inefficient because they cannot account for different
individuals’ heterogeneous preferences and because they are frequently the
inefficient result of special-interest-group lobbying. In other words, for models
to be internally coherent and consistent, it is important to externalize difficult
questions from the research.
At the same time, these questions are relevant not specifically for choice of
law but for domestic law. Whether mandatory rules are good or bad depends
crucially on whether they represent considerations of general welfare or
whether they merely represent the interests of special groups. This is a problem
of public choice on the one hand and democratic legitimacy on the other. As
such, it is obviously central to the legitimacy of law and extremely hard to
answer in the abstract. But the argument, from the private-law model and the
international-law model alike, that these questions cannot be answered from a

155. WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 54.
156. Trachtman, Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 16.
157. Id.
158. Id. (“[I]t would leave bad law in place when there are no cross-border connections, and
eviscerate good law when there are cross-border connections.”).
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choice-of-law perspective, seems disingenuous if the entire models rely on
them. The opposite seems true: the respective models are responses, albeit
quite radical and crude ones, to precisely this question.
It does not seem to be too much of a stretch to say that the private-law
model of choice of law is not only an extension of substantive private law,159 but
that it also represents a position within debates on substantive law. Choice of
law and, especially, party autonomy are used primarily not just to determine the
most appropriate law but as a way to circumvent undue restrictions on freedom
of contract stemming from mandatory law.160 Traditionally, the limits to the
creation of mandatory law have been the domain not of choice of law but of the
political process. Now party autonomy is established as an equivalent substitute
for democratic determination of the applicable law—not as a theoretical and
rhetorical trope but as a concrete reality.161 Yet party determination of the
applicable law in purely domestic contracts is hardly an issue of choice of law; it
is an issue of the relationship between the state and the private. Governance
becomes entirely private governance; states are no more than inconvenient
obstacles to be circumvented.
The opposite move can be seen in the international-law model. Tellingly,
this model views choice of law as a mere subset of international law, and
questions of the conflict between laws are not essentially different from
conflicts between different policies more generally. For Trachtman, “the
problems of choice of law and prescriptive jurisdiction . . . address the problem
of the horizontal scope of state power.”162 The vertical scope of state power over
individuals is ignored. In an international-law model in which states are viewed
as unitary actors, the problem of inefficient domestic rules cannot exist because
those disadvantaged by such norms, private parties, are simply absent from the
analysis, or rather, their interests are subsumed into those of states. As a
consequence, wherever policies exist, actors are by definition prevented from
opting out of them. The political idea behind this, even if not spelled out
explicitly, is one of global governance as exclusively public governance, a cartel
of states that allocate jurisdiction among themselves, but collectively protect
themselves against manipulation by individuals.

159. See text accompanying note 138.
160. For their own mistrust in mandatory rules, see WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 5, at 52–68.
Elsewhere, WHINCOP & KEYES argue that “[p]arty autonomy is not desirable simply for liberal
reasons, but because it provides an opportunity to limit the consequences of rules that are sometimes
wrong.” It is hard to see how the reason they name—the preference of private ordering over public
regulation—is not “simply liberal.” Id. at 187. See also id. at 9 (“[T]o permit parties to make the
choice . . . is not only likely to result in economically efficient outcomes, but in more liberal ones.”);
Posner, supra note 138, at xv (“The party-centered approach corresponds to the emphasis in economics
on the free market.”). For criticism, see Richardson, supra note 5, at 200–01.
161. Cf. Florian Rödl, Private Law Beyond Democracy? On the Legitimacy of Private Law “Beyond
the State,”,56 AM. J. COMP. L. Part III (forthcoming 2008).
162. Trachtman, Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 4.
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C. Between and Beyond Private and International
Despite their differences, both models thus share one important
characteristic: they ultimately dispense of choice of law. The private-law model
of choice of law has been shown to be merely a model of private law proper; the
international-law model of choice of law is merely a model of international law
proper. The private-law model disregards the international aspect, and the
international-law model disregards the private aspect of private international
law. If these two are the only available options, then private international law
must be either private law or international law, for it cannot be both. What is
more, the decision as to which it is depends in part on one’s general ideology
(preference for the state or for the individual), in part on one’s general idea of
law (private law is purely private law, or private law is public law), but not on
any conviction specific to private international law. And how could it, if there is
nothing specific to private international law?
This would be an implausible outcome. At least since Joseph Story
established Private International Law as a subfield of international law, distinct
from both public international law and domestic private law alike,163 private
international law has existed in tension between private law on the one hand
and international law on the other. It seems implausible, to say the least, that all
of this was just the fruit of muddled thinking. It seems implausible that all the
subtle middle positions the field takes in, so many disputes—between forum
preference and universalism, between party autonomy and mandatory rules,
between substantive justice and conflicts justice—are merely errors of the mind.
If economic models must dispense with such middle positions in order to
function, the mistake may lie less with the field under research and more with
the economic models.
This makes the combined models more attractive. Indeed, Guzman, for
example, realizes the problems with the assumptions of both the private- and
the international-law model. Unfortunately, his solution is simply to defer
public-choice issues to the realm of empirical facts (with which he is not
concerned).164 Guzman’s own approach to party autonomy accords, in principle,
with the international-law model: party autonomy has its place only when no
third-party externalities exist. Where he disagrees with Trachtman is merely in
the largely empirical questions whether such externalities arise or not in certain
areas like securities law. Consequently, the impact of choice of law on
substantive law is here largely delegated to objective determinations of
applicable law. Choice-of-law rules should be designed so as to not give
incentives to states to pass laws with considerable externalities.

163. STORY, supra note 26, § 9, 13; cf. Ralf Michaels, Public and Private International Law: German
Views on Global Issues, 4 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 121, 127–28 (2008).
164. Guzman, supra note 8, at 903–04.
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Guzman’s model, which focuses on objective determination of applicable
law, is supplemented more than contrasted with the literature on regulatory
competition. This literature looks at party autonomy precisely as an instrument
to force states to abolish inefficient laws that hold them back in the competition
for choice of their laws. Of course, the exact impact that party autonomy has on
inefficient laws is quite unclear. In many areas, there will likely be no impact at
all, because choice-of-law cases are rare. Where there is an impact, it is not
always clear whether it is positive or negative. Party autonomy may lead to
more-efficient domestic laws, because it forces states to compete over which
produces the most attractive rules. The exact opposite may be true as well:
party autonomy leads to less effective rules if many of the parties disadvantaged
by them will, rather than lobby for their abolition, simply opt out of them, and
domestic lobbies are not strong enough to change them domestically. The
combination of these two effects provides a plausible explanation why states
confine the application of certain rules to domestic contracts, or why some
countries, in particular socialist countries, have altogether different rules for
international transactions than for domestic ones.
More importantly, not only is it difficult to assess whether a specific
mandatory rule is desirable or not, it is also not clear from the outset whether
individuals or states can better assess this question. This is so even in a domestic
context. It is true even more in an international context, where different states
have different rules and therefore presumably different views on the desirability
of those rules. The focus on only party autonomy does not grasp the full extent
of this problem because it merely replicates the simple domestic public–private
tension on the international sphere. But there is not only one public in the
international sphere. The international tension is much complicated by the
partial overlap and partial tension among different state laws and therefore
different views of the public. The opposite of private ordering is not merely
public ordering but decentralized, multiple public ordering. A fully combined
model will establish a complex combination of the relation between party
autonomy and mandatory rules and carefully calibrated criteria to determine
which state provides these mandatory rules in the first place.
The huge (though largely untapped) potential of both the combined models
and the regulatory competition literature lies in the fact that they explicitly
address the question that the other approaches simply bracket: the combination
between the economics of domestic lawmaking (private and public) and the
economics of choice of law (private and public). This is a combination that
traditional doctrine has not yet addressed adequately and one in which
economics can make a true contribution. So far, much of that contribution has
been confined to regulatory competition through party autonomy and the
question whether this is a good or a bad thing. A proper analysis, by contrast,
would ask not whether it is good or bad in the abstract, but whether private or
public determination of the applicable law is superior regarding the specific
issue in mind, and what regulatory consequences different public
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determinations would have. Choice of law, in this vision, will neither fully yield
to a market for laws (as the private-law model would have it), nor will it fully
replace a market of laws (as the international-law model would have it).
Instead, it will become the venue in which global governance takes place in an
ever-altering complex mediation between private and public interests.
V
CONCLUSION: CHOICE OF LAW DISCOVERS ECONOMICS
If the analysis presented in this article is correct, then the economic analysis
of choice of law has not fulfilled the hopes. The pragmatism it provides has
proven to be laden with ideology. Its empirical foundations are mixed with
strong and often counterintuitive assumptions. Economics has provided choice
of law with theoretical foundation, but instead of one it has offered three such
theories—two of which turned out to be mere emanations from other fields.
Economics is able to give clear guidelines for problems once a model is chosen,
but it cannot give clear guidelines as to which model should be chosen, and the
clear guidelines it can give for specific cases rest on a high degree of abstraction.
And nonetheless (or better: precisely for these reasons), economics makes
hugely important contributions to the field of choice of law.
A first finding is that the economic analyses that have been proposed so far
are riddled with the same problems as many normative economic analyses.
Abstraction leads to false necessities and circular reasoning, sweeping
normative suggestions are built on shaky models, ad hoc appeals to plausibility
replace rigorous analysis, more or less plausible assumptions substitute for
empirical data, problems are defined away, and abstract general statements are
inapplicable in the real world. This critique is not unimportant, but it is
relatively uninteresting. It does not capture what is peculiar to the economic
analysis of choice of law; similar problems riddle economic analysis more
generally, and more careful economists have long accepted and responded to
such critiques. If some of the existing economic models are too abstract, or the
conclusions too sweeping, perhaps all that is needed are better analyses within
these models in order to provide solutions to our doctrinal problems. Moreover,
as long as different models compete and lead to different outcomes, any false
claim to objectivity is easily refuted.
A second finding concerns the existence of these different models and the
results they lead to. Quite remarkably, once the economic models are translated
into doctrines, they look similar to existing doctrines—they reach the same
results, and they face the same problems. Economic models repeat approaches
that are known from doctrine and therefore replicate the outcomes of these old
models. The discourse within the models uses the language of economics
(though rarely in a purely formalized way), but this language looks to a large
extent like a mere translation of familiar doctrinal structures.
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This is an important finding because it strips the economic models of both
their otherness and their alleged novelty, and because it suggests that, if
economic analysts replicate the problems of choice of law, these problems are
stickier than previously thought. However, this critique is likewise somewhat
facile. Stripping economic models of their economics must necessarily leave
them wanting. It is its otherness, not its familiarity, that makes the economic
language interesting and potentially enriching to doctrinal models. The charm
of the private-law model and the international-law model lies in the way in
which they radically disentangle the private and the international aspect of
choice of law and then drive them to extremes within their models. Although
neither model is successful as a complete theory of choice of law, viewed
together they show how radical the tension is that riddles our discipline, how
radical its outcomes would be if only one of the two aspects ruled, and how
improbable and at the same time fascinating it is that the discipline can keep the
two aspects together.
This leaves a third finding that concerns especially the combined model, and
this finding does provide something new. The combined models do focus our
attention on something that traditional choice-of-law doctrine has largely
ignored: the potential impact of choice-of-law rules on the substance of
domestic laws. Notably, these models rarely produce specific rules of choice of
law. Guzman’s model operates at such a high degree of abstraction as to make
specific application almost impossible. Also, the distinction between a privatelaw model and an international-law model is repeated within these combined
models, in which one focuses on the optimal allocation of jurisdiction and the
other focuses on the salutary impact of party autonomy. But such irremediable
differences, although they may be perceived as embarrassing to those seeking
clear answers, are immensely helpful. They suggest that choice of law is an
additional element of global governance beyond those of private ordering and
international relations, and, in combining those two, perhaps even the most
important one.
If the economic models fail, both in combination and individually, to
provide convincing responses to pressing problems of choice of law, this is not
for lack of trying. The ultimate inability of economics to provide a convincing
theory of choice of law suggests that, strange as this may sound, such a theory
may be best sought within the practice and doctrine of choice of law. The
impossibility of translating all problems of choice of law into economics
(despite, or perhaps because of, the immense relevance of economics for choice
of law) suggests the need for an understanding of choice of law that both
highlights and downplays economic constraints and political determination. In
the end, it appears that in all the apparent messiness, there is an intrinsic and
apparently relatively stable inherent rationality to private international law.
Economic models partly fail to grasp this rationality, and then what they grasp
often fails to be of relevance. Or economic models replicate this rationality, but
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then look inferior to the doctrinal models on which they build. Ultimately, it is
up to choice of law as law to solve the problems of conflicting laws.
Choice of law is not economics of law, just as law is not economics. Choice
of law is dependent on economics, and it can benefit from economic reasoning.
But, ultimately, the economic model cannot replace the need to find proper
solutions in the real world. Perhaps economists have felt for a long time that the
problems of choice of law are simply too complex, too messy, and based on too
many variables to enable holistic attempts at achieving the economic optimum.
The doctrine is fortunate that analysts have overcome these concerns and have
presented their models. But what it takes away from these models is that, in the
end, it will be up to the law, not to another field, to deal with them.

